

False beliefs and related notions in cross-linguistic comparison

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Overview

- 1 Theoretical considerations
 - The contrafactive gap
 - Contrafactivity and counterfactuality
 - False beliefs, deceptive perceptions, and impossible desires
- 2 Cross-linguistic relations
 - Mood-based systems: Ambrym
 - Lexeme-based systems: Mandarin
- 3 Contrafactive verbs
- 4 Conclusion



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- A contrafactive propositional-attitude verb would necessarily have a gappy paradigm excluding first person forms of the present (*#I contra ice is warm*.)
- Linguistically, then, the lexical verb meaning might not be the optimal place to encode epistemic distance.

False beliefs and related linguistic contexts

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Contrafactivity vs. Counterfactuality


- Contrafactive statement: A statement which presupposes that the prejacent is false (in the actual world) (Strohmaier & Wimmer, 2025).

Contrafactivity vs. Counterfactuality

- Contrafactive statement: A statement which presupposes that the prejacent is false (in the actual world) ([Strohmaier & Wimmer, 2025](#)).
- Counterfactual statement: A statement about counterfactual indices ([von Prince, 2019](#)).



Counterfactuality as a concept




Counterfactual expressions in false-belief reports

In reporting false beliefs, we often use counterfactual expressions:

- (1) *Sie denkt, die Erde wäre/sei flach.*
she thinks the earth be.KONJII/KONJI flat
"she thinks the earth is/were flat."
- (2) *Ich dachte, es würde anbrennen.*
"I thought it would burn."




False beliefs as counterfactual contexts



*Sie glaubt, die Erde **wäre/sei** flach.*
 "She thinks the earth is/were flat."



False beliefs as counterfactual contexts



*Ich dachte das Telefon **wäre** kaputt.*

"I thought the phone was/were broken."

Counterfactual contexts I

from von Prince (2024), based on Yong (2016)

- ① Counterfactual conditionals, including:
 - ① Regular counterfactual conditionals: *If I had known better, I would have started earlier, If you tried harder, you could do better*
 - ② Concessive counterfactual conditionals: *Even if we had ordered more pizza, the kids would still have been hungry.*
 - ③ Conditionals with condition elided or expressed through non-clausal phrases: *I wouldn't do this; In that case, I would leave sooner*
- ② Counterfactual necessity and possibility, including:
 - ① Counterfactual necessity: *I should have started earlier.*
 - ② Counterfactual possibility: *We could have won.*
- ③ Optatives: *If (only) you could see us now!*

⋮

Counterfactual contexts II

- 4 Counterfactual object clauses expressing the following:
 - 1 False beliefs: *she thought he was at home, I believed them to be right.*
 - 2 Deceptive perceptions: *the wood looks as if it were moving;*
 - 3 Impossible desires of the present or unfulfilled needs of the past: *I wish it were true, I wanted to go (but didn't/but no longer plan to).*
- 5 Frustrative and inconsequential contexts, often translated into English with *almost*.


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Mood-based systems: Ambrym

Vanuatu



Daakaka predicate structure

SUBJ.AGR	(=)TAM	(AUX)	(REDUP-)	Verb	(-RES)	(=TRANS)
<i>na/ko/ ...</i>	<i>=m, ...</i>	<i>du/pwer</i>	<i>...</i>	<i>...</i>	<i>...</i>	<i>=ne</i>

Table: Structure of the finite verbal complex in Daakaka

- (3) *na=m yungpan=ne wye*
 1SG=REAL thirsty=TRANS water
 "I'm thirsty for water."

Daakaka TAM system

	enclitic	proclitic	monosyllabic
Pos. Realis	<i>=m</i>	<i>mw=</i>	<i>mwe/mV</i>
Neg. Realis			<i>to</i>
Pos. Potential	<i>=p</i>	<i>w=</i>	<i>wV</i>
Neg. Potential	<i>=n</i>		<i>nV</i>
Distal	<i>=t</i>	<i>t=</i>	<i>tV</i>
(Open Polarity (Change of State)			<i>doo</i> <i>bwet</i>

Table: The Daakaka TAM system

Daakaka I

from von Prince (2024)

- (4) *ka we eli buluwa wa ge myane tomo te tu*
 SUBCONJ POT dig hole POT like with rat CONJ DIST
vu
 good
 “if he had dug a hole like the rat, it would have been good”
- (5) *ko=m ongane ma ge myane uli-sye te*
 2SG=REAL hear REAL be.like with skin-3S.POSS DIST
pwer
 stay
 “it feels as if it had a skin” (exp50:36)



Daakaka II

- (6) *te yaapu=an ma dimye ka te mea*
 CONJ big.man=DEF REAL think MOD.COMP DIST jump
vyan a=te te ma mea usili
 go LOC=MED CONJ REAL jump follow
 “her husband thought that she had jumped there
 and he jumped after her” (sto47:72)

Daakie

from Krifka (2016)

- (7) *kye-m deme ka te we mee gon*
 3PC-RE think CP.NR DST fruit.TR dragonplum FOC

ngi-ye

FOC-PROX

“They thought that they were just dragonplum fruits”

(Wili1.030)

- (8) *mo gotó-ne ka te mese baabap ten*
 RE make-TR CP.NR DST sick very much

“He **pretended** to be very sick”, translation

(Aesop094)

English is more lexeme-based than Daakie in the case of 8.

Lexeme-based systems: Mandarin

Mandarin



derivative work of [Mandarin in China.png](#) by [ASDFGHJ](#). Author Kanguole, based on Language Atlas of China, by Stephen Adolphe Wurm, Rong Li, Theo Baumann and Mei W. Lee, Longman, 1987.

Counterfactuality

There are various conditional complementizers, most of which are neutral wrt modality, but some of which predominantly introduce counterfactual conditionals.

- zero
- 假使 *jiǎshǐ*
- 如果 (说) *rúguǒ (shuō)*
- 假如 *jiǎrú*
- 万一 *wànyī* (if by any chance, just in case)
- ...的话 *de huà*
- 除非 *chúfēi* (only if, unless)
- 要是 *yàoshi* if only
- 要不是 *yàobushi* “if it hadn't been for”

Propositional attitudes

Ye & Hsu (2024) find different levels of “epistemic evidentiality” for the following verbs:

- 考虑 *kǎolù*: consider (factive)
- 认为 *rènwéi*: think, believe
- 觉得 *juéde*: feel, think
- 想 *xiǎng*: feel, think
- 以为 *yǐwéi*: think erroneously (per lexical entry in Wenlin dictionary)



Deceptive perceptions

- 好像 *hǎoxiàng*: like
- 似乎 *sìhū*: as if

Contrafactive verbs

The roles of verbs in expressing counterfactuality may be easily ignored. In fact, it is a widely acknowledged truth that different verbs may show different frequencies in CFs. For example in English, the event introduced by “wish” is more likely to be interpreted as a CF than “hope”. (Yong, 2016: 117)

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- Dutch *zich inbeelden* (German *sich einbilden*) → not a bad candidate

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(13) *Imte i-l-maur...*
wish 3SG.IRR-IPFV-alive
“I wish he were alive...” (Guérin, 2011)

Mavea *imte*

- (14) *imte ka-v ka-ǎ a ǎ alu-na*
if 1SG.IRR-say 1SG.IRR-go to-3SG.POSS then FUT
ro me [...] ǎ auri rarua i-isaǎ ai
[...] life 3PL.DL 3SG.IRR-how

“Supposed I had stayed with him, [...] how would our life have been?” (VG20171047.056-058, described in [von Prince et al. 2018](#)).



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- The lexical verb meaning is not the most obvious choice for it, because it would create a gappy paradigm (at least pragmatically).
- Many languages use tense/aspect/mood marking on the embedded clause and/or the embedding verb.
- Languages where tense/aspect/mood marking is less prominent might rely on lexical meanings to a greater extent.



Thank you!

A note about universal claims

*No natural language has contrafactive attitude verbs.
(Strohmaier & Wimmer, 2025)*

Has anyone checked every single language for this?

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- Counterfactual contexts are primarily expressed by (special combinations of) tense/aspect/mood markers, special complementizers, or adverbs (Yong, 2016; von Prince, 2024).
- Subordinating verbs that require counterfactual complement clauses are rare, and mostly associated with wishes.

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