The future is what the universe wants

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From directives to future assertions in three easy steps

- (1) **ko=p** swave wotop en-tak! 2SG=POT throw breadfruit DEF-PROX "Throw this breadfruit down!" (1214)
- (2) nye kyun na=m ka [na=p sikya nya wa maga] 1s just 1s=real want 1s=pot touch 3D pot be.fast "Only I, I wanted to reach them quickly." (0103)
- (3) ki=t me a-tak [ka na w=ane kimim]
 2P=DIST come LOC.DEM-PROX ASR 1s POT=eat 2P
 "...if you come here, I will eat you!" (3135)

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
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Structure of the talk

- Background
- 2 Directives in Daakaka
- 3 Directives and futures
- 4 To-Do-List vs. Modal assertion
- **5** Futures and embedded clauses
- **6** Outlook

Daakaka

- Daakaka is an Oceanic language of Vanuatu, spoken by about one thousand people on the island of Ambrym.
- The basic sentence structure is SVO.
- The core of a finite sentence consists of a subject pronoun, a TAM clitic and the verb:
 - (4) na=m vyan etes
 1sG=REAL go at.sea
 a. "I went to the sea."
 b. "I am going to the sea."



Daakaka: the TAMP system

SBJ.AGR	(=)TAM	(AUX)	(REDUP-)	Verb	(-res)	(=TR)
na,	= <i>m</i> ,	du,pwer	•••			=ne

Table: Structure of the verbal complex in Daakaka

	enclitic	proclitic	monosyllabic
Pos. Realis	=m	mw=	mwe/mV
Neg. Realis			to
Pos. Potential	=p	w=	wV
Neg. Potential	=n		nV
Distal	=t	t=	tV
Open Polarity			doo
Change of State			bwet

Table: List of TMA markers in Daakaka

Daakaka imperatives

• As in many other languages, bare verb roots can be used in Daakaka to utter an imperative:

```
(5) Me! come "Come!"
```

- The more verbose directives with the potential mood marker also require a subject-agreement marker:
 - (6) **ko=p** swave!
 2sg=pot throw
 "Throw it down!" (1218)

Potential mood prohibitives

- (7) saka ki=n tiye nye
 MOD.NEG 2P=NEG.POT kill 1s
 "don't kill me" (3183)
- (8) ka na=n me kyun, s-ok gyesan mwe pwer.

 ASR 1s=NEG.POT come just CL3-1s.POSS work REAL stay
 "I should have come, I had work to do."
- (9) ko=n peten!2s=NEG.POT true"you have to keep your word" (in a story where the promise will be broken)

Potential mood directives

- The subject of a directive in potential mood does not have to refer to a second person:
 - (10) Te mwe kye ge-kerase ka-ka: 'E, ko=p me
 DISC REAL call REDUP-LIE REDUP-say hey 2s=pot come
 da=p vyan'

 1D.IN=POT go
 "So he called him and said to him, lying: 'Hey, come, let's go'"
 (6164)
 - (11) **eye we me** knife POT come
 "The knife shall come / give me the knife."
- The directive is then still addressed to a second person.
- The best way to translate these directives into English might involve "let" ("let's go", "let the knife come").

Potential mood directives: are they imperatives?

"By 'imperative' we mean a verb form that is typically used to convey directive force, and is not typically used in subordinate roles (distinct from infinitives and subjunctives)" (von Fintel & Iatridou, submitted)

– there is probably a lesson here about the difficulty of applying labels cross-linguistically in general (cf. Haspelmath, 2012), and specifically when it comes to infinitives and subjunctives (Landau, 2004; Nikolaeva, 2007; Quer, 2009).

Potential mood in future assertions

Assertions are structurally more complex than directives:

- (12) *Ki=p du a-tak,* [na=p kueli vyan liye ok bosi.]' 2P=POT stay LOC.DEM-PROX 1S=POT return go take 1s.Poss chisel "You stay here, I will go back (let me go back) and take my chisel" (5118)
- (13) (ka) nye ka na=p ka ASR 1s ASR 1s=POT fly "I will fly away" (4994)
- (14) yaapu ka we seling me god ASR POT descend come "[...] God will come down to us" (0369)

Directive = assertion - x

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 Jump to assumptions

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
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Theoretical assumptions




In contrast to previous work (Thomason & Gupta, 1980; Tedeschi, 1981; Placek & Müller, 2007; Ippolito, 2003, 2013), I assume that quantification over branches/ histories is not restricted to those branches that pass through the actual present i_c .

Directives: modal assertions or to-do-list material?


- If the assumptions made so far are correct, then which side does the Daakaka data come down on in the debate about the nature of imperatives?
- I will argue that it is compatible with more than one view, but I favor the to-do-list view.

Adding sets of histories to to-do-lists



(cf. Portner, 2005, 2007)

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
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• ..

Directives as modal assertions



- such that IMP implies that the speaker has a preference for histories in H,
- and where the speaker has to believe that some continuations of the actual history h_c are in H and some are not, IMP involves a preference-related ordering source, ...(Kaufmann, 2012; Condoravdi & Lauer, 2012)

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- What restricts the range of meanings a mood head can have?
- We might expect a much wider range of variation between languages in terms of their speech acts than we actually see.
- The difference in complexity between directives and future assertions, which appears to be consistent cross-linguistically (if there is a difference in complexity, the directive is usually the less complex category), would not be accounted for.

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- Judging from their forms, potential mood directives in Daakaka are just like future assertions minus *x*.
- I suggested that *x* was a universal quantifier over histories and that potential mood directives were just sets of histories.
- I have argued that this assumption is compatible with different views on imperatives but that a to-do-list approach was preferable for architectural reasons.

Potential mood embedded under ka "say, want, think"

- (17) tomo mwe **ka** nge wuk **ka** we vyan nii rat REAL say 3s already MOD POT go hide "Rat said he wanted to hide first." (1454)
- (18) mwe **ka** we pwer kuon REAL want POT sleep just "He just wanted to sleep" (1614)
- (19) nye kyun na=m ka na=p sikya nya wa maga 1s just 1s=real want 1s=pot touch 3D pot be.fast "Only I, I wanted to reach them quickly." (0103)

What the universe wants

The assertion marker ka can be preceded by a realis marker. However, the realis marker only ever precedes a predicate.

- (20) te timy-an t-en yas-en ma ka
 DISC father.of-3s.POSS and-3s.POSS mother.of-3s.POSS REAL want
 ye=p tiye tyu swa
 3D=POT kill chicken one
 "the father and the mother will kill a chicken." (1643)
- te pyaavep kevene ngok a vyanten ke-kevene **ma ka**disc afternoon every 2s and man redup-every real want

 ki=**p** du nyur-nyur-ane nye bili na ka yaa te vyan

 2p=pot stay redup-think-trans 1s time comp mod sun dist go

 every afternoon you and every man you will think of me when the

 sun goes down (2548)

Whose wishes determine the future?

te pyaavep kevene ngok a vyanten ke-kevene **ma ka**DISC afternoon every 2s and man REDUP-every REAL want
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every afternoon you and every man you will think of me when the
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$$\forall h': h' \in WANT_{\mathbf{x}, i_1}, i_1 < i_c. h' \in \{h | \exists i \in h : i \in R_I, i_1 < i.\phi(i)\}$$

Expletive subjects in Daakaka: otherwise absent

- [or mwe myaek], mwe pwer te ma ka na w=esi apyang place REAL be.night REAL stay DISC REAL say 1s POT=see fire en-te bwe mwe me ma ge=vi
 DEF-MEDIAL CONT REAL come REAL like=what
 "It was night, he stayed and said: 'I want to see how this fire is coming [about].'" (3594)
- (24) **ko=m** ongane ma ge myane uli-sye te pwer, ko=m
 2s=real hear real be.like with skin-3s.poss dist stay 2s=real
 doko-ne mwe yas na mwe yas
 pull-trans real strong comp real strong
 "it feels as if it had a skin, you pull it, it's very strong" (6011)

From "want" to a universal quantifier over histories

· Potential mood directive:

```
\lambda h: h \in R_H. \exists i \in h, i \in R_I, i_j < i.\phi(i)
```

• *ka* "want" with complement clause:

```
\forall h' : h' \in WANT_{\mathbf{a},i_1}, i_1 < i_c.h' \in \{h | \exists i \in h : i \in R_I, i_1 < i.\phi(i)\}
```

• future assertion: $\forall h : h \in R_H. \exists i \in h, i \in R_I, i_j < i.\phi(i)$

Complementizer ka: Talking about possibilities

...there is also a complementizer/ serial verb ka, which is probably not a universal quantifier over histories, because it is essential in statements about possibilities:

- (25) ko=m **kuowilye ka** ko=**p** kuo a-te
 2s=real know comp 2s=pot run loc.dem-medial
 "You can go there" (0111)
- (26) ka ...kuli vis en-te wa wese ka w=i
 ASR edible.part.of weapon DEF-MEDIAL POT be.enough COMP POTlim
 COP five
 "there might be five bullets" (6361)

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